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Abstract 
Existing knowledge has been shown to interact with episodic information in a variety of 
memory tasks. The present study examined a known bias due to existing knowledge in the 
context of memory for facial features. Specifically, we examined if the category bias, a 
systematic error in remembering a target toward the prototypical location of its region, 
increased as a function of distance away from its prototypical location and if time and degree 
of distortion moderated the bias. We manipulated eye width along a horizontal axis to create 
a set of face stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants saw one face at a time, and after a short 
delay, they were asked to reproduce the location of one of the eyes and complete a 
recognition task. In Experiment 2, we increased the delay from 2000ms to 5000ms. We 
hypothesized and found that bias towards the prototype increased for the moderately 
distorted face conditions; however, the decrease in bias in the highly distorted conditions was 
not statistically significant. Additionally, bias did not increase over time. We discuss our 
results in the context of Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) category adjustment model, as well as 
the practical implications of our study in the field of eyewitness memory.   
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Category Bias in Facial Memory  
 Existing knowledge plays a crucial role in our judgments about a stimulus (e.g., 
Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). In spatial memory, one well-documented demonstration of the 
effect is referred to as the category bias (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). The 
category bias is a systematic error in locating a stimulus in relation to the superordinate 
category to which the stimulus belongs. These distortions in memory of locations are very 
common and have been found with a variety of stimuli and tasks (Hund & Plumert, 2002; 
Sampaio & Wang, 2009). For example, judgments of relative location between two cities are 
biased according to the relative location of the states the cities belong to (Stevens & Coupe, 
1978). Thus, individuals incorrectly infer that San Diego, California is to the west of Reno, 
Nevada presumably because of their knowledge that the state of California is generally to the 
west of the state of Nevada. More recently, the effect has been extended to memory for facial 
features, with the remembered position of an eye within a face showing a systematic bias 
towards the prototypical eye location (Sampaio & Symons, 2013). The study of biases in 
memory for faces not only is theoretically interesting but also has many practical 
implications.  
Previous research suggests that people use a diverse array of cognitive processes to 
remember and distinguish between faces. These processes range from noting characteristics 
of individual features (e.g., eye color) to forming a spatial representation of the distance 
between features (see Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002 for a review). Biases in memory for 
faces, including the category bias, can shed light into the accuracy of the processes and 
products involved in choosing a person out of a lineup and of creating a sketch of a suspect’s   
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face. Similarly, discovering the variables that may moderate the effect of category bias in 
memory for faces has important practical applications in forensic settings. 
Basic Processes in Face Recognition   
 Multiple processes have been proposed to explain how people remember and 
distinguish between faces. These processes fall under two broad categories. First, featural 
processing refers to using characteristics of individual features to remember and distinguish 
between faces. Second, configural processing refers to using the relationship between 
features to remember and distinguish between faces. Empirical evidence exists for each 
proposed mechanism, and the existing literature does not seem to allow for the identification 
of a dominant mechanism (see Rakover, 2002 for a critical review).  
 Featural processing involves using the characteristics of facial features to make 
discrimination and recognition judgments (Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000). Evidence for 
featural processing stems from the observation that inverting a face decreases people’s ability 
to use configural information to distinguish between and remember faces, but it does not 
affect their ability to use featural characteristics. For example, in a series of experiments, 
Freire et al. demonstrated that inversion impaired participants’ ability to use configural 
information in visual discrimination and recognition tasks. Inversion did not, however, 
impair participants’ ability to distinguish between and remember faces with feature 
manipulations. Specifically, in one experiment, participants accurately discriminated between 
inverted faces with featural differences. In a second experiment using a forced-choice 
recognition task, where the inverted target face and inverted foil face differed in feature 
characteristics, participants accurately chose the target face. Additionally, Barton, Keenan,  
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and Bass (2001) found that inverting a face selectively disrupted participants’ ability to 
discern changes in the distance between features but not for changes in eye color. Finally, 
Leder and Bruce (2000) found that inversion impaired participants’ memory performance on 
a recognition task for faces with spacing manipulations but not for faces with hair, mouth, 
and eye color manipulations.  
 Similar to the inversion literature, neurological research provides additional evidence 
that featural and configural processing represent two discrete mechanisms in face processing. 
Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, and Brent (2001), for example, tested the ability of patients 
who had bilateral cataracts early in life to discriminate between faces with featural and 
configural manipulations. Specifically, patients viewed pairs of faces; some faces had 
different features (e.g., different mouths), and some faces had spacing differences (e.g., the 
distance between the eyes differed between the faces). Patients were sensitive to featural 
changes; however, compared to controls, patients performed poorly when discriminating 
between faces that differed in the spacing between features. The purpose of the experiment 
was to determine if a critical period for developing the ability to use configural information 
exists, that is, the study sought to determine whether people who are born blind and regain 
their sight later in life can develop the ability to use configural information. The results 
showed that patients could only use featural information to distinguish between faces, and 
controls could use configural or featural information (depending on the stimuli), 
demonstrating that featural processing represents a discrete mechanism in face processing.  
 In contrast to featural processing, configural processing refers to the way in which 
people use the entire face during recognition. Holistic processing represents one of three  
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subtypes of configural processing. In holistic processing, the entire face is encoded as a 
complete, integrated unit. Research supporting holistic processing focuses on how people 
remember facial information better when it is given in the context of the whole face. For 
example, Farah, Wilson, Tanaka, and Drain (1998) found superior recognition accuracy for 
faces that were identical to acquisition items or completely different. Participants performed 
significantly worse on a recognition test when the face contained a target feature from the old 
face and the irrelevant, or foil, features were different (e.g., the same eyes as the old face but 
a different jaw, nose, mouth, etc.). Valentine and Bruce (1986a, 1986b) observed that their 
participants were significantly slower in recognizing jumbled, distinctive faces than 
recognizing jumbled, prototypical (i.e., average looking) faces. Both Farah et al. and 
Valentine and Bruce argue, albeit using a different vocabulary, that face recognition involves 
a matching process, whereby people use their memory for an entire face as a template and 
attempt to match it to the face they are trying to identify.  
 A second subtype of configural processing is first-order relational processing. This 
type of processing involves using the basic relationship between features to identify stimuli 
as faces; for example, eyes are always above the nose, and the nose is always above the 
mouth. Imaging research using fMRI supports first-order relational processing by 
demonstrating a distinctive pattern of neural activity when people view faces over other types 
of stimuli (Haxby et al., 2001). Moreover, Baenninger (1994) tested recognition accuracy for 
faces with configural modifications and found a significant decline in accuracy when the 
faces contained disrupted first-order relations (e.g., the nose located at the top of the head).  
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 The third subtype of configural processing is second-order relational processing. This 
type of processing refers to the ways in which people use spatial relations between features to 
remember and discriminate between faces. People display a remarkable level of accuracy for 
detecting these distances. Using a simple recognition task (i.e., at recognition, participants 
were asked to judge if the presented face was the same or different as the acquisition face), 
Haig (1984) observed that his participants’ just noticeable difference (JND) for eye 
movements was between 1.75 and 2.53 pixels. Evidence for the importance of second-order 
processing comes from the observation that inverting faces both impairs recognition accuracy 
(e.g., Yin, 1969; Rhodes et al., 1989) and impairs people’s ability to accurately gauge 
distances between features (Barton et al., 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000). Specifically, the 
inversion literature demonstrates that when faces are upright, people use spatial relationships 
to make accurate discrimination and recognition judgments.  
 In sum, facial memory involves featural processing and three types of configural 
processing. Holistic processing refers to using the entire face as a template and engaging in a 
matching process (Valentine & Bruce, 1986, 1986b; Farah et al., 1998). First-order relational 
processing refers to using basic relationships between features to recognize stimuli as faces 
(Haxby et al., 2001; Baenninger, 1994). Second-order relational processing refers to the way 
in which people use spatial relationships to recognize faces and discriminate between faces 
(Haig, 1984; Barton et al., 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000). While evidence exists for all types of 
processing, there is no clear conclusion about which process is dominant (Rakover, 2002)   
Schemata   
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 Examining facial memory using schema theory may help elucidate a specific process 
through which facial memory, or at least reports from memory, can become biased. All 
schema theories propose that existing knowledge structures provide a context for encoding 
new information and that existing knowledge affects what information is encoded (Alba & 
Hasher, 1983). Minksy’s (1975) frame theory, for example, offers a useful way to 
conceptualize the way in which a schema serves as a template for encoding new information. 
Minsky uses the term “frame” to describe the existing knowledge structure that represents a 
schematic instance (p. 1). Within each frame, multiple terminals exist for representing 
detailed information. For example, an office frame may have a terminal for a desk, chair, 
bookshelf, computer, etc. Each terminal comes already assigned with a default value (i.e., an 
average looking desk, chair, bookshelf, etc.). When a person encounters a new office, the 
existing frame functions as a template, and the person adjusts default values to account for 
specific details (e.g., noting the specific type of desk). If a person fails to encode details for a 
terminal, default values are automatically used.  
 The formation of a face schema or prototype may reflect some measure of central 
tendency (Solso & McCarthy, 1981). For instance, in their experiment, Solso and McCarthy 
took a generic face template used by police and generated variations from it in such a way 
that that some features occurred at a higher frequency (e.g., one particular mouth occurred at 
a higher frequency in the acquisition stimuli). During the acquisition phase, participants 
viewed ten variations of the prototype face but not the prototype itself. The recognition test 
immediately following encoding, as well as a second test that occurred six weeks later, 
revealed that while in general participants displayed high levels of accuracy in distinguishing  
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old from new faces, the prototype face elicited extremely high false alarm rates (only one 
subject did not falsely recognize the prototype). Additionally, participants had higher 
confidence levels for the prototype face than for the faces they actually viewed. Solso and 
McCarthy suggested that people may generate a prototype based on the integration of 
multiple frequency distributions. In Solso and McCarthy’s study, people seem to have 
combined the modal facial features in the acquisition stimuli to generate a prototypical face.  
Although the Solso and McCarthy’s (1981) study examined the formation of a prototype 
based on integrating modal facial features, a similar process could account for the formation 
of a prototype based on the location of facial features or the spatial relationships between 
features. For example, a person may generate a frequency distribution for the width between 
a person’s eyes. Eye width on their prototype face reflects the mean width from a frequency 
distribution. This complex, unconscious process may represent the underlying process in 
schema formation. 
 Research using word lists as the stimuli has found similar results. For example, 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) used Deese’s (1959) original word lists, built around a 
critical word (e.g., a word list containing a list of specific types of fruit when the critical 
word is “fruit”), to test memory. Recall rates for non-presented, critical words were equal to 
or greater than the items participants studied. During recognition testing, participants 
displayed approximately equal false alarm and hit rates; that is, participants were just as 
likely to recognize the non-presented, critical words as the words they actually viewed during 
the acquisition phase. Additionally, participants expressed high confidence levels for critical 
words. As one possible explanation, Roediger and McDermott suggested a schema-based  
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hypothesis for their results; specifically, the critical words may represent the prototype for 
the word lists, and participants were making schema-based inference errors. 
 Selection represents one of the basic mechanisms of schemata (Alba & Hasher, 
1983). Selection refers to the way in which existing knowledge structures influence which 
stimuli are attended to and thus remembered. Specifically, highly developed knowledge 
structures, or schemata, allow for efficient integration of new information. In contrast, adding 
new information without a background context is a relatively inefficient process.   
 Face memory research has shown that face schemata facilitate memory for schematic 
faces and that the absence of a schema for a type of face (e.g., inverted or other-race faces) 
hinders memory. For instance, Goldstein (1975) demonstrated that inversion affects 
recognition accuracy for adults more than it does for children. Goldstein suggests that the 
development of highly tuned facial schemata may help adults remember upright faces but 
detract from their ability to recognize schema atypical, inverted faces. Additionally, 
Goldstein and Chance (1980) demonstrated that children show less susceptibility to the own-
race effect (i.e., the tendency to make significantly more errors when trying to remember 
faces of a different race). Goldstein and Chance’s study revealed that Caucasian children’s 
memory for Japanese and Caucasian faces increases through grade six. During that time, 
children show similar accuracy levels for both types of faces. In contrast, Caucasian adults 
display a wide discrepancy in recognition accuracy levels between Caucasian and Japanese 
faces. Similar to the schema explanation for inversion effects, Goldstein and Chance argue 
that—because prolonged and repeated exposure leads to complex but inflexible face  
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schemata—adults have finely tuned own-race face schemata that help them remember 
schematic faces but detract from their ability to remember schema atypical faces.   
 Although evidence demonstrates that schemata provide a template for encoding that 
enhances memory, other research suggests that schema atypical stimuli may draw additional 
attentional resources that enhance memory (Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 
1990). In their experiment, Johnston et al. presented participants with long sequences of four 
words arranged in a spatial configuration (i.e., an array consisting of four boxes). Some 
words occurred at a high frequency (familiar words), while other words appeared 
infrequently (novel words). On each trial, participants viewed an array with a different word 
in each of the four boxes. Following a delay, participants viewed the same array with the 
probed word in all four boxes. Participants then indicated the location of the probed word in 
the array they viewed during the acquisition phase; for example, if the word “dog” appeared 
in the top box during the acquisition phase, the participant should select the top box during 
the test phase. When compared with familiar words, participants displayed higher levels of 
accuracy for the infrequently occurring, novel words, an effect the authors termed “novel pop 
out.”  
 After a series of replications (Johnston, Hawley, & Farnham, 1993), Johnston, 
Hawley, and Farnham (1994) proposed mismatch theory. Mismatch theory postulates that 
when viewing familiar stimuli, schema-driven processing dominates and serves to conserve 
cognitive resources; moreover, an inhibition of data-driven, bottom-up processing 
accompanies schema-driven processing. However, upon viewing a schema atypical stimulus, 
“novel pop out” shifts perception to data-driven processing. Johnson et al. conjecture that the  
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“novel pop out” effect serves an evolutionary function by counterbalancing top-down, 
schema-driven processing.    
 Research using scenes as stimuli provides additional evidence for the attention 
postulate of schema theory (Friedman, 1979). Friedman presented participants with scenes 
containing schematic and schema atypical stimuli. During the experiment, participants’ eye 
movements were monitored. Results indicated that participants spent more time starting at 
schema atypical stimuli, suggesting that schema consistency affects attention allocation. 
Additionally, recognition testing revealed that participants were more likely to notice 
changes in schema atypical stimuli and make correct rejections.  
 Additional evidence for the attention postulate of schema theory using scenes as 
stimuli comes from Gordon (2004). Gordon presented participants with scenes containing 
schematic (e.g., a motorcycle at a gas station) and schema atypical (e.g., a harp at a gas 
station) stimuli. Following a delay, participants were shown a probe (an ampersand or 
percentage sign) and were instructed to press the mouse key corresponding to the correct 
symbol (e.g., left click if the symbol is an ampersand). When participants viewed scenes for 
longer than 150ms, they showed faster reaction times when the symbol occurred at the 
location of the schema atypical object. This suggests that participants focused their attention 
on the location of the schema atypical stimuli, providing additional support for the attention 
postulate of schema theory.  
 In addition to previously discussed stimulus domains, evidence suggests that the 
attention postulate of schema theory applies to facial memory (Perkins, 1991). Perkins 
examined the role of attention and schemata in the context of facial memory by presenting  
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participants with either a schematic face or a schema atypical face (e.g., a face with the nose 
located on top of the head). At recognition, participants were presented with two cards 
containing the target feature and a distracter feature, both in isolation (e.g., two noses). The 
results of the forced-choice recognition test indicated that participants were more accurate at 
recognizing features from schema atypical faces, suggesting that participants allocated their 
attention to the schema atypical faces, which enhanced recognition accuracy.  
 In sum, research suggesting that, through exposure, people develop complex 
schemata for own-race and upright faces that enhance memory is supported by the 
observation that exposure duration is associated with increased recognition accuracy for 
frequently seen faces and decreased recognition accuracy for infrequently seen faces 
(Goldstein, 1975; Goldstein and Chance, 1980). In contrast, a separate body of literature 
suggests that schema atypical stimuli—including faces—affect attention allocation and 
recognition accuracy (Friedman, 1979; Johnston et al., 1990; Perkins, 1991; Gordon, 2004). 
Although this research may seem contradictory, Johnston et al.’s conjecture that schema-
driven processing and processing associated with the “novel pop out” effect both occur and 
counterbalance each other offers a resolution.       
 In addition to providing a template for encoding and influencing attention, multiple 
studies have demonstrated the effect schemata have in guiding responses in recall and 
recognition tasks. For example, in a classic study, Bartlett (1932) observed that his western 
participant sample profoundly altered a Native American folktale during a recall test; 
specifically, they modified the structure and content in the direction of a schematic story 
from western culture (as cited in Brewer, 2000). Brewer and Treyens (1981) brought  
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participants into a graduate student’s office under the guise that they needed to wait until the 
experiment was ready. Afterwards, participants’ memory for objects in the office was tested. 
An examination of errors in recall and recognition tests revealed that participants inferred the 
presence of objects typically found in a graduate students office (e.g., books and pencils) that 
were absent from the office, which suggests that episodic information becomes integrated 
with existing, schematic knowledge for offices. Similarly, Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) 
demonstrated inference errors in procedural schemata (e.g., remembering buying meat at the 
grocery store when that event was absent from the acquisition phase) and causal-inference 
errors (e.g., remembering someone taking an orange from the bottom of the pile when shown 
a picture of oranges all over the floor in the acquisition phase).  
 In the context of facial memory, schemata may also guide responses. Goldstein, 
Stephenson, and Chance (1977) analyzed false alarm results from six studies. Frequency 
distributions revealed that certain faces consistently elicited false alarms; that is, the 
distribution of false alarms among foils was non-random. Offering a possible explanation, 
Goldstein et al. postulated that faces eliciting high false alarm rates may represent a 
prototype; that is, the faces may appear as a composite of modal facial features from the 
population. Solso and McCarthy’s (1981) observation that participants expressed more 
confidence in having seen a prototype face, generated by integrating modal features, than for 
the faces they actually viewed supports Goldstein et al.’s conjecture.  
Schemata and Spatial Memory 
 Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) category adjustment model (CA) represents a version of 
schema theory that was developed to examine spatial memory; therefore, it is a useful model  
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for examining second-order relational processing (i.e., people’s memory for spatial 
relationships between features) in facial memory. Consistent with schema theory, the model 
proposes that existing knowledge structures influence the processing of and memory for 
incoming information. Unlike schema theories that make qualitative predictions about the 
effect of schemata on memory (e.g., testing recognition accuracy for schematic vs. atypical 
stimuli), the CA model details an underlying mechanism, based on Bayes’ principles, that 
explains how spatial category (a coarse-grain representation) and coordinate information for 
a target location (a fine-grain representation) interact.    
 The CA model is related to Minsky’s (1975) frame theory. Through the process of 
coarse-grain coding, people divide a space into categories. Within each category, people 
generate a central, prototypical location; that is, the prototype reflects the location that would 
minimize variance if a person guessed the location of a target location over repeated trials. 
Central to the CA model is the idea that a new target location is encoded as a distribution of 
values, and the precision of encoding determines the spread of the distribution. A fine-grain 
value refers to a sample from the distribution of values. At the time of recall, a subject 
weighs the fine-grain value with the coarse-grain representation based on the relative strength 
of these representations (Huttenlocher et al., 1991). For example, applied to face memory, the 
CA model would suggest that if the subject only has a vague memory for the eye location, 
they may rely heavily on their knowledge of a prototypical eye location, and place the 
recalled eye close to the prototype. At the extreme, if there was no fine-grain representation, 
the prototype would be used to estimate the location of a specific eye. 
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 The category, defined as the distribution of values within category boundaries, 
interacts with coordinate, fine-grain memory during the recall test. For example, during a 
recall task, a subject may use their memory for the specific eye they viewed during the 
acquisition phase and their knowledge of a prototypical eye location (i.e., coarse-grain 
representation) to produce an answer. The coarse-grain representation and fine-grain value 
differentially affect recall responses depending on the weight placed on each value. 
Consistency determines the prototype’s weight; for example, in memory for eye location, if a 
subject knows that the eyes are always located in a specific spot, they will heavily weight the 
coarse-grain representation. The prototype is thought to function to reduce variance; that is, if 
a subject only has a vague memory of where the eye is in a particular face, choosing the 
average location in a memory test will, over repeated trials, reduce the mean distance 
between the real location and the recalled location (Huttenlocher et al., 1991). 
 Through the process of truncation, category boundaries confine recalled locations to 
the category. Specifically, truncation refers to the process whereby people’s memories for 
stimulus values that occur outside inexact category boundaries adjust inwards towards the 
prototypical location. For example, if a subject viewed a circle with a dot located slightly 
outside the category boundary (i.e., the quadrant of the circle in which the dot is located), the 
subject may place the dot inside the quadrant at recall. In addition, the strength of truncation 
varies as a function of category boundary inexactness. Specifically, truncation effects 
increase as category boundaries becomes more exact (i.e., a single value) and decrease as a 
category boundaries become more inexact (i.e., a range of values). With circular spaces,  
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Huttenlocher (1991) notes that boundary inexactness results from having to eyeball the 
location of the axes dividing the circle into quadrants. 
  In a series of classic experiments, Huttenlocher et al. (1991) tested the predictions of 
the CA model by examining the pattern of dot localization within a circle; specifically, 
participants viewed a series of circles, each containing one dot. Combined, the test stimuli set 
included dots evenly distributed over the entire circle. After viewing each circle, participants 
completed a recall test. Participants displayed a bias away from vertical and horizontal lines, 
suggesting that participants mentally break the circle into quadrants when encoding dot 
location; that is, they generate category boundaries. Furthermore, bias towards a prototypical 
location (i.e., in between the center of the circle and the circumference and along a 45-degree 
angle) increased as a distracter task depleted participants’ attentional resources. Taken 
together, the results of the experiments provide support for the idea that recall responses 
reflect an interaction between fine-grain and coarse-grain representations. 
 In addition to depleting attentional resources, evidence suggests time increases 
category bias. Using a square space (model house), Hund and Plumert (2002) tested the 
effect of delay on category bias. Compared with participants tested immediately after 
encoding, adults and children tested after a 12-minute delay demonstrated an increased 
reliance on the category; that is, participants displayed a pattern of bias towards the center of 
the quadrant in which the encoded object was located. Additionally, Sampaio and Wang 
(2012) manipulated the delay between encoding (500ms or 3000ms) and retrieval. Results 
indicated that time increased the level of bias created by the new category. The increase in  
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bias seems to reflect Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) assumption of the faster rate of decay of the 
fine-grain representation compared to the coarse-grain representation.  
 Although Huttenlocher et al. (1991) originally used the CA model to test memory for 
dots inside circles, the model has been extended to other domains such as geography 
(Friedman, 2009) and other spaces such as locations within a college campus (Uttal, 
Friedman, Hand, & Warren, 2010; Sampaio & Cardwell, 2012). Sampaio and Symons 
(2013), for example, took the CA approach to investigate memory for a facial feature 
location.  Merged with the face inversion effect in perception (Yin, 1969), they hypothesized 
that because of extensive exposure to upright faces, people develop a generic face prototype 
that affects which information in a particular face is encoded. They further hypothesized that 
people hold a more finely-tuned prototype for feature locations in upright faces than in 
upside down faces. At the time of retrieval, the position of a feature should be adjusted with 
the prototypical location of that feature within a prototypical face. Based on Huttenlocher et 
al.’s (1991) category adjustment model, they expected and found that the prototype value on 
upright faces is indeed more precise/less variable than that in inverted faces, and that 
memory for specific feature locations in the former case showed a larger category bias than 
in the latter case. They interpreted the results as indicating that the relative weighing of the 
fine-grain and coarse-grain representations in facial feature localization is a function of the 
participants’ degree of certainty.    
Experiment 1 
 Recent data show that people hold a face prototype for upright faces and that category 
bias operates in facial memory. However, research has not yet examined what variables may  
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moderate the category bias in facial memory. In Experiment 1, we examined how degree of 
distortion away from a prototype affected the magnitude of the category bias. We 
hypothesized that when viewing prototypical stimuli or stimuli that are moderately distorted 
from the prototype, participants would rely on their coarse-grain representation, which would 
be reflected by increasing levels of bias as the distance away from the prototype increased. 
When viewing stimuli highly distorted from the prototype, however, we predicted an increase 
in fine-grain exactness, which would be reflected by a reduced bias in recalled, extreme eye 
locations. We manipulated the distance between the eyes to create a set of faces that 
contained eyes located moderately distant from the eyes’ prototypical location and a set of 
faces that contained eyes located highly distant from their prototypical location (e.g., at the 
extreme, these faces have eyes touching at the center). It was hypothesized that memory 
performance would be low for the moderately distorted stimuli (Sampaio & Symons , 2013), 
as it was expected that estimation of location from memory would heavily reflect the weight 
of the prototypical location of the eye. In contrast, it was hypothesized that performance 
would be higher for estimates of extreme eye location, as it was expected they would reflect 
a heavier weight of the fine-grain representation compared to the moderately distorted 
stimuli.  
         By examining the role of distortion away from the prototype in moderating the 
magnitude of category bias, the present study may help resolve inconsistencies in the 
literature regarding the effect of schema consistency on facial memory. Previous research has 
demonstrated that sometimes schema-inconsistent information enhances memory (e.g., 
Perkins, 1991), and at other times it hinders memory (e.g., Goldstein, 1975). In this project,  
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we tried to address the question of whether level of distortion from the prototype/schema can 
explain the discrepancy; that is, we hypothesized that the degree of distortion plays a crucial 
role in memory for schema atypical information, with the degree of distortion from a 
schema/prototype determining fine-grain inexactness. With respect to this project, we 
hypothesized that the magnitude of the bias would vary as a function of the level of distortion 
of a particular eye location from its prototypical location. Specifically, we expected that the 
magnitude of bias would increase as the degree of distortion increases, but only for 
moderately distorted stimuli, as in Sampaio and Symons (2013). However, as eye location 
starts to be highly distorted from its prototypical location, performance would improve, 
perhaps because people would start noticing the distortion from the prototype; that is, the 
relative weight placed on the coarse-grain and fine-grain representation would shift, resulting 
in reduced bias towards the prototype.  
 The first experiment included three phases, including a prototype identification task, a 
recall task, and a recognition task. Because we examined bias that results from integrating a 
prototypical eye location, the first phase of the experiment served to identify the prototypical 
eye location.  Participants marked where they thought the prototypical location of each eye 
was for faces with eyes removed. Second, participants completed a recall task for eye 
location. Third, participants completed a multiple-choice recognition task. It was 
hypothesized that eye location in moderately distorted faces would show lower accuracy than 
in highly distorted faces, because high distortions would reduce fine-grain inexactness, 
resulting in a shift in the weight placed on the prototype and the fine-grain value.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-nine Western Washington University undergraduate psychology students 
recruited through the SONA system participated in this study for course credit. Fourteen 
participants were male, and 15 participants were female. Twenty-seven participants were 
right handed, and two participants were left handed.    
Materials 
 Acquisition Items. 
 Twelve face sets were created. From each of the 12 base faces, eight variations were 
created by changing the spacing between the eyes, for a total of 96 acquisition faces. All 
faces were adult Caucasian males. The eye spacing on each face was adjusted inward and 
outward, with the exact spacing amount dependent on the width of the face. The width 
adjustment for all eight variations was identical. Eyes were moved along a horizontal axis, 
and width adjustments ranged from four to eight pixels. Four faces had four pixel 
adjustments, four faces had five pixel adjustments, three faces had six pixel adjustments, and 
one face had eight pixel adjustments. When viewed on the computer monitors used for the 
experiment, mean face width was 164.75 millimeters (SD = 13.53), and mean face height was 
259.25 millimeters (SD = 7.50). 
 Test Stimuli. 
 For the recognition test, all 96 acquisition faces were used to create 12 multiple-
choice arrays (12 arrays displaying all 8 variations of a base face); each array included eight 
faces with equal spacing measurements. We numbered faces one through eight, with one  
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denoting the face with eyes touching in the center and eight denoting the face with eyes 
touching the outer edge of the face (see Appendix A and B for complete list of stimuli used 
in experiment). In addition, for the recall test, there were 12 response faces created by 
removing the eyes on the base faces and filling in the space with a neutral skin tone.  
Design  
 The present study used a fully within-participants design. In the first phase of the 
experiment, participants were presented with all 12 base faces and marked where they 
thought the pupil should be located. In the second phase, all participants viewed all 96 face 
stimuli twice. For the first block of 96 faces, participants reproduced the location of the eye 
on the right side of the screen. For the second block of 96 faces, participants reproduced the 
location of the eye on the left side of the screen. In the third phase of the experiment, all 
participants viewed all 96 faces and completed a recognition test. For both the recall and 
recognition test, the order the faces appeared in was randomized.  
Procedure 
 Upon arriving to the lab, the experimenter directed each participant into one of four 
private rooms, each containing a desktop computer. We used E-Prime software to administer 
the experiment. The experimenter started the program, entered the participant number, the 
session number, the participant’s sex, entered their handedness (determined by asking the 
participant), and their own researcher ID number. After reviewing the accuracy of the 
information, the experimenter started the program and returned to the center room. Next, a 
screen displayed instructing participants to use their mouse curser to mark where they 
thought the pupil of an eye should be. When viewed on the computer screen, faces were  
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looking straight ahead. After pressing the space bar, a second screen appeared reiterating the 
instructions. After pressing the space bar a second time, a priming screen appeared telling 
participants whether to mark the location of the pupil on the right or left side of the screen. 
Next, a face where the eyes had been replaced with a neutral skin tone appeared, and 
participants used their mouse curser to mark the location of the right or left pupil. The 
process repeated until the participants marked pupil location for all 12 base faces.  
 Upon completion of the prototype identification stage, a screen displayed that 
instructed participants to remember the position of the eye on the right side of the screen for 
the first set of faces and the eye on the left side of the screen for the second set of faces. For 
each trial, a face appeared for 300ms, followed by a mask for 500ms (a red grid) and a black 
screen for 1500ms (for a total of 2000ms delay). After 2000ms, an eyeless response face 
corresponding to the acquisition face appeared, and participants market their recalled location 
of the eye using the mouse curser. After marking their recalled location, a screen appeared 
instructing participants to rate their confidence by selecting a key from 1 to 7, with large 
numbers indicating higher levels of confidence. After participants completed the first block 
of 96 faces, an intermission screen appeared instructing participants to remember the location 
of the left eye. The second test block was identical to the first block. 
 Upon completion of the recall task, a screen displayed instructing participants to 
remember the face they were about to see. After pressing the space bar to start the test, a 
single face appeared for 300ms, followed immediately by the multiple-choice test screen 
displaying eight variations of the face they viewed. Participants indicated the face they 
recognized by pressing the numerical key corresponding to their selection. After making their  
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selection, a screen displayed asking participants to use the same 7-point confidence scale to 
rate their level of confidence. This process repeated for all 96 faces.  
Results  
 Experiment 1 tested the role of level of distortion away from a prototype in 
moderating category bias in facial memory; specifically, we predicted that bias would 
increase as a function of distance away from the prototype. However, in the extremely 
distorted conditions, we predicted a decrease in bias resulting from the effect of schema-
inconsistency; that is, schema-inconsistency would result in a heavier weight being placed on 
participants’ fine-grain representation.  
 To prepare the data for analysis, we first eliminated face one from the analysis, as the 
inward and outward manipulations different by one unit, making this face different from 
faces two through 12. Specifically, pixel width between all eight conditions was not equal in 
face one. Second, to prevent outliers from impeding identification of accurate prototype, we 
trimmed values exceeding 25 units away from a central eye location (manipulation condition 
4) (n = 9 or 5.7% of the data). Although the chosen, central location was arbitrary, 77% of 
trimmed outliers exceed 94 units away from manipulation four, meaning—in addition to 
being on the other side of the screen—they would be in excess of 25 units away from any of 
the face manipulation conditions. Third, we trimmed recall responses exceeding 25 units (n = 
148 or 6.6% of the data) away from the true location; keeping these aberrant data would 
unjustly inflate our effect size. Fourth, because the program used for the experiment had a 
glitch, all left eye location values had the same number; we removed these data from our 
analysis. We followed the standard procedure to quantify bias, by subtracting the true  
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location from the recalled location. To examine differences in confidence and reaction time 
between correct and incorrect responses, we created a dummy coded column for recall and 
recognition data. For recall data, a zero denotes that the recalled location was within 3 units 
of the true location, and a one denotes that the recalled location exceeded 3 units away from 
the correct location. For the recognition test, a zero denotes that the participant chose the 
correct face.  
 This study examined bias as a function of distance away from a prototypical eye 
location. To identify the prototypical location, we calculated the mean selected x coordinate 
(i.e., the location on the horizontal axis) for right eye location for each face, as well as the 
average location for the face set. Next, we performed a two-tailed, one-sample t-test 
comparing participants’ selected prototype eye location to the closest manipulation condition. 
Participants’ selected prototype (M = 374.78, SD = 6.45) was not significantly different from 
eye location in condition five (M = 376.55), t(28) = -1.48, p > .05.    
 We analyzed recall data using a within-participants ANOVA. Our data did not meet 
the sphericity assumption; therefore, we interpreted our results using the Huynh-Feldt 
adjustment. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of distance away from the prototype on bias, 
F(1.96, 53) = 7.42, p < .05, partial ƞ2 = .215.  Planned polynomial contrasts revealed that our 
data follow a significant cubic trend; that is, bias increased as a function of distance away 
from the prototype, and participants adjusted responses inwards from the edge of the face and 
outwards from the center of the face, F(1, 27) = 6.11, p < .05.  
 Although the cubic trend emerged as significant (see figure 1), we tested the 
significance of the reduction in bias by performing a linear regression using manipulation  
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conditions two through seven. If the trend was linear (i.e., there was no drop in bias in the 
extreme conditions), the predicted values from the regression for manipulation conditions 
one and eight should not be significantly different from the obtained values. We performed 
one-sample t-tests comparing the obtained values against the predicted values. Manipulation 
condition one (M = 1.70, SD = 5.14) was not significantly different from the predicted value 
(M = 2.994), t(27) = -1.33, p > .05. Manipulation condition eight (M = -2.64, SD = 5.3) was 
not significantly different from the predicted value (X = -3.5), t(27) = .859, p > .05. In sum, 
although the upward trend in bias as eye location moved away from the prototype decreased 
abruptly in the extreme conditions, the reductions were not significantly different from a 
linear trend.   
 Following Haig’s (1984) observation that his participants were more sensitive to 
inward than outward horizontal eye manipulations, we compared the absolute value of 
inward and outward manipulation bias using a paired samples t-test. The test revealed that 
the difference in bias between outward (M = 3.34, SD = 2.44) and inward (M = 3.07, SD = 
2.19) manipulation conditions was not significantly different, t(27) = -.373, p = > .05.  
 Turning to recognition data, a X
2 
test of independence revealed that the face 
participants recognized face was dependent on the face they viewed during the acquisition 
phase, X
2
(49, N = 2552) = 5019, p < .001. Descriptive statistics (see Table 1), suggest that 
when participants committed a false alarm, the majority adjusted their responses outwards in 
manipulation conditions one, two (88.2%), and three (77.1%). Additionally, most participants 
adjusted their responses inwards in manipulation conditions eight, seven (88.5%), and six 
(77.9%). In manipulation conditions four and five, Q-Q plots suggest false alarms are  
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relatively evenly distributed around the prototype. This observation, however, needs to be 
interpreted cautiously, as both distributions failed Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s test of normality.  
  Confidence levels for recall responses within 3 units of the true location (M = 4.92, 
SD = .85) were significantly higher than confidence responses for recalled locations 
exceeding 3 units away from the true location (M = 4.78, SD = .89), t(27) = 2.61, p = < .05. 
Examining recognition data, participants were not more confident when they chose the 
correct (M = 5.27, SD = .783) location over the incorrect location (M = 5.274, SD = .78), 
t(28) = -.117, p = > .05.   
 We examined the effect of manipulation condition on reaction time using within-
participants ANOVA. To adjust for a violation of sphericity, we interpreted the results using 
the Huynh-Felt adjustment. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of manipulation condition 
on reaction time, F(6.08, 164.14) = 2.16, p = < .05, partial ƞ2 = .074.  Planned pair-wise 
comparisons between conditions one (M= 2295.71, SD = 1022.14) and two (M = 2165.67, SD 
= 927.13) revealed a borderline statistical trend t(27) = 1.61, p = .12. Planned pair-wise 
comparisons between conditions seven (M = 2141.5, SD = 163.58) and eight (M = 2342.06, 
SD = 174.2) revealed a significant increase in reaction time, t(27) = -2.411, p = < .05. 
Manipulation condition did not affect reaction time for recognition responses, F(5.75, 
137.89) = .993, p = > .05, partial ƞ2 = .04.  
 Turning to reaction time and accuracy, a paired samples t-test revealed that 
participants displayed shorter reaction times when recalling a location within three units of 
the true location (M = 2097.6, SD = 827.052) than when recalling a location exceeding three 
unites away from the true location (M = 2252.18, SD = 882.12), t(27) = -.2.84, p  < .05.  
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Additionally, participants displayed significantly shorter reaction times when recognizing the 
correct face (M = 714.52, SD = 188.09) than the incorrect face (M = 885.93, SD = 256.85), 
t(28) = -4.65,  p  < .001. 
Discussion 
 Results from Experiment 1 are consistent with previous work demonstrating the 
category bias in facial memory (Sampaio & Symons, 2013). Recall data demonstrated that 
participants adjusted their responses towards a prototypical eye location, with the level of 
bias increasing as a function of distance away from the prototype. The pattern of false alarms 
obtained in the recognition test also confirms the category bias; that is, when participants 
chose the incorrect face, they selected faces with eyes closer to the prototype.  
 Experiment 1 found a mean decrease in bias in the extreme conditions; however, the 
decrease did not approach statistical significance. Given the small effect size of the omnibus 
ANOVA and the subtlety of the biases, the lack of statistical significance may reflect a lack 
of statistical power. Response time data reveal that participants took significantly longer 
when making a recall response in condition eight than in condition seven. The increase in 
reaction time between conditions two and one narrowly missed being a statistical trend. The 
significant increase in reaction time demonstrates that a change is occurring between the 
moderately and highly distorted conditions; however, interpreting the meaning of the 
increase in reaction time in the context of the CA model and schema-consistency literature 
requires additional investigation.  
 Participants displayed significantly reduced response times when recalling a location 
within three units of the true coordinates. Additionally, participants displayed higher  
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confidence levels when recalling a location within three units of the true coordinates. A 
relationship between confidence and response time may exist, whereby participants make  
faster decisions when they are confident in their responses. Additionally, mean biases were 
lowest at the prototype, suggesting that many of the correct recall responses occurred at or 
near the prototype. At the prototype, coarse-grain and fine-grain representations reinforce 
each other, and relying on either representation—or any differentially weighted 
combination—would yield an accurate response. Consistency between these representations 
may account for the decrease in response times.   
Experiment 2 
 Time is known to affect the degree of category bias in spatial memory tasks, such that 
in general there is a larger bias with time (Hund & Plumert, 2002; Sampaio & Wang, 2012). 
The effect is thought to be due to the coordinate information fading more rapidly than the 
spatial category, and thus in estimating locations from memory, more weight is given to the 
former rather than the latter. Experiment 2 examined the effect of time on category bias in 
the context of facial memory. In Experiment 2, we increased the delay from 2000ms to 
5000ms. In Sampaio and Wang (2009), a response time of 5000ms was used in the long-
delay condition. We continued to manipulate distortion away from the prototype by varying 
eye location.  
Method 
Participants  
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 Twenty-two Western Washington University undergraduate psychology students 
recruited through the SONA system participated in this study for course credit. Nine 
participants were male and 13 participants were female. Two participants were left handed 
and 20 participants were right handed.  
Materials 
 The same materials used for Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2. To keep the 
experiment under 60 minutes and prevent participant fatigue, Experiment 2 randomly 
selected and used six base faces instead of 12. The prototype identification stage used six 
base faces without eyes. Acquisition stimuli for the recall and recognition task consisted of 
48 faces, six base faces with 8 equal horizontal eye manipulations. Test stimuli for the recall 
task consisted of six response faces with the eyes removed and filled with a neutral skin tone. 
Test stimuli for the recognition task consisted of six multiple-choice slides in the same 
configuration as Experiment 1.    
Design  
 Experiment 2 used a fully within-participants design. The prototype identification 
stage consisted of six trials, one for each base face. The recall test consisted of 96 trials 
divided into two blocks. The multiple-choice recognition test consisted of 48 trials in a single 
block. For both the recall and recognition task, participants viewed all six base faces in all 
eight configurations. For both the recall and recognition test, we randomized the order the 
faces appeared in. 
Procedure 
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 Experiment 2 used the same testing procedure as Experiment 1; however, we 
increased the delay from 2000ms to 5000ms.  
Results 
 Experiment 1 examined the effect of schema inconsistency in moderating the 
category bias in facial memory. To test a second moderating variable and elaborate on the 
results obtained in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 examined the effect of time in moderating the 
category bias, as well as the persistence of schema atypical effects.  
 We performed the same data preparation procedures as Experiment 1. For the 
prototype data, we trimmed eight values (13% of data set); all values exceeded 91 units away 
from condition four. For the recall data, we trimmed 108 values (11.7%) of data set. 
Additionally, subject nine told the experimenter that they did not become aware of the 
instructions until halfway through the experiment; we excluded this participant from the 
analyses.  
 We performed one-sample t-tests comparing participants’ selected prototypical eye 
location against the closest face manipulation condition. Participants’ mean selected 
prototype eye location (M = 375.41, SD = 5.25) was closest to manipulation condition four 
(M = 372.8), t(19) = 2.22 , p = < .05. Experiment 2 used fewer faces to keep the experiment 
within 60 minutes; this may account for the discrepancy in prototype faces between 
Experiment 1 and two.  
 Figure 2 displays bias plotted against manipulation condition. We performed a 
within-participants ANOVA to test the effect of manipulation condition. Our data did not 
possess sphericity; therefore, we interpreted our results using the Huynh-Feldt adjustment.   
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The ANOVA revealed no main effect of manipulation condition on bias, F(2.26, 42.96) = 
.804, p = .468, partial ƞ2= .041.  
 Turning to recognition data, a X
2
 test of independence revealed that participants’ 
recognized face was dependent on the face manipulation condition viewed during the 
acquisition phase, X
2
(49, N = 880) = 2157, p < .001. Recognition results (see Table 2) 
partially resemble the pattern found in Experiment 1. When participants committed a false 
alarm in manipulation conditions one, two, and three, the majority of participants adjusted 
their responses outwards. In manipulation conditions eight, seven, and six, the majority of 
participants adjusted their responses inwards. Unlike Experiment 1, however, false alarms 
were not evenly distributed around manipulation conditions four and five. The same sample 
that yielded the bizarre response patterns in the recall task may account for this discrepancy.  
 Confidence levels for recalled locations within 3 units of the correct location (M = 
4.81, SD = .84) were not different from confidence levels for recalled locations exceeding 3 
units away from the true location (M = 4.75, SD = .68), t(19) = .771, p = .45. Examining 
recognition data, confidence levels for correct responses (M = 5.57, SD = .55) were 
significantly higher than confidence levels for incorrect responses (M = 5.03, SD = .52), t(20) 
= 8.104, p < .01.  
 We used a within-participants ANOVA to examine the relationship between 
manipulation condition and reaction time. The data met the sphericity assumption, X
2
(27) = 
31.49, p = .265. Similar to the lack of an effect in the omnibus ANOVA for bias, eye location 
did not affect reaction time, F(7, 133) = .612, p = .745, partial ƞ2 = .031. A statistical trend 
suggests than participants may display lower reaction times when recognizing a correct face  
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(M= 867.86, SD = 281.49) than recognizing an incorrect face (M = 1047.36, SD = 372.97), 
t(20) = -1.96, p = .064.  
Discussion  
 The graph plotting bias against manipulation condition (see Figure 2) follows a 
downward, step-like pattern and does not match any type of polynomial contrast. This is  
inconsistent with the CA model (Huttenlocher, et al., 1991) and the results from Experiment 
1. Additionally, previous research examining the effect of time on the category bias 
demonstrates that bias increases over longer delay periods (Hund & Plumert, 2002; Sampaio 
& Wang, 2012). The reduction in bias across conditions in Experiment 2 violates basic 
principles of memory and likely reflects a statistical anomaly. The sample in Experiment 2 
consisted of undergraduate psychology students who waited until the end of the quarter to 
fulfill their research credit requirement. The unusual data may reflect an aberrant sample; 
perhaps participant nine was the only one to admit they did not follow the instructions. 
Furthermore, trimming rates (i.e., the percentage of data values that had to be removed 
because they were outliers) were approximately twice as large as they were in experiment 1, 
which provides additional support for the aberrant sample conjecture.    
 In contrast to recall data, recognition data are consistent with the CA model; that is, 
the pattern of false alarms suggest that when participants error, they choose a face closer to 
the prototype. Additionally, and unlike the recall data, responses in the recognition data were 
dependent upon the manipulation condition viewed during the acquisition phase.  
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General Discussion 
 The present study found a systematic bias towards a prototypical eye location after a 
delay of 2000ms. With recall data in Experiment 1, the study possessed adequate statistical 
power to detect the category bias in the omnibus ANOVA, but it was not sufficient to detect 
a significant difference between moderately and highly distorted conditions. Recall data from 
Experiment 2 revealed no effect of eye position on bias; therefore, we cannot draw 
conclusions concerning the effect of time on category bias for recalled locations and whether 
schema atypical effects for recalled locations persist over longer delay intervals.    
 The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the CA model (Huttenlocher et al., 
1991) and provide a replication of research demonstrating the category bias in facial memory 
(Sampaio and Symons, 2013). Several, compatible explanations exist to explain our pattern 
of results. First, at the prototype, coarse-grain and fine-grain representations match each 
other; that is, the coarse-grain representation is the prototype and the encoded stimulus (i.e., 
the fine-grain representation) was presented at the prototype. Regardless of how participants 
weighted each representation, bias would remain extremely low. Second, participants placed 
progressively heavier weights on their coarse-grain representation as the stimulus moved 
away from the prototype.  
 Although our lack of statistical power prevented the identification of a significant 
effect of extreme distortion on bias reduction, examining possible explanations for the mean 
decrease in bias in the extreme conditions warrants consideration. Huttenlocher et al. (1991) 
demonstrated that when participants’ attentional resources were depleted by completing a 
distracter task during the experiment, category bias increased; that is, as the fine-grain  
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representation became more inexact, participants’ relied more heavily on their coarse-grain 
representation. Although we manipulated degree of distortion, previous research examining 
the attention postulate of schema theory offers two explanations (Friedman, 1979; Johnston 
et al., 1990; Gordon, 2004).  
 Friedman (1979) and Gordon (2004) demonstrated that participants’ focused their 
attention on schema atypical features in a scene. Although we specifically instructed our 
participants to remember eye location, any differences in the amount of time spent attending 
to eye position should have affected the weight participants placed on their fine-grain 
representation. If the same effect that occurred in the Friedman study and the Gordon study 
was operating in our study, participants should have spent comparatively more time 
observing eye location in the extreme conditions, which would have affected fine-grain 
inexactness and the degree of category bias. To examine this conjecture in more depth, future 
research could monitor participants’ eye gaze. 
 A second explanation stems from the mismatch theory research examining novel pop 
out effects (Johnston et al. 1990; Johnston et al., 1993; Johnston et al., 1994). Specifically, 
novel stimuli may induce qualitative changes in processing. With familiar, schematic stimuli, 
top down, schema-driven processing dominates; however, novel stimuli result in a shift 
towards data-driven processing. Conceptually, mismatch theory is compatible with the CA 
model. When viewing prototypical or moderately distorted stimuli, schema-driven processing 
may dominate, resulting in a comparatively heavy weight, reflected by bias, being placed on 
the coarse-grain representation. However, in the extreme conditions, the processing change  
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associated with the novel pop out effect may dominate, resulting in a significant shift in the 
weight placed on the fine-grain representation and a reduction in bias.  
 For the recognition task, the possibility exists that the subtlety of the horizontal eye 
movements in our stimuli created a just noticeable difference (JND) problem. Therefore, we 
should consider research examining people’s threshold for detecting horizontal eye 
manipulations. When JND is defined as above chance accuracy, Haig (1984) demonstrated 
that his participants’ JND was 1.75 pixels for inward manipulations and 2.53 pixels for 
outward manipulations. In Haig’s study, 1.2 pixels equaled one minute of visual angle, which 
Graham  (1965) notes nears human visual acuity limitations (as cited in Haig, 1984). When 
JND is defined as achieving greater than 75% recognition accuracy, Ge, Luo, Nishimura, and 
Lee (2003) observed that the JND for Chinese participants recognizing differences in the 
distance between horizontal eye manipulations of Chairman Mao’s face exceed visual acuity 
limits (JND = 9.8 pixels for inward manipulations and 11.55 pixels for outward 
manipulations). Additionally, using the same criteria, Bredart and Devue (2006) found that 
the JND for participants detecting differences in eye width manipulations in their colleagues’ 
faces were 7.2 pixels for inward manipulations and 8.7 pixels for outward manipulations. Ge 
et al. used Adobe Photoshop to manipulate eye width; when Bredart and Devue (2006) 
replicated Ge et al.’s research with a different sample and stimuli, they used GIMP with the 
same pixel manipulation, suggesting consistency in the pixel measurement tool between 
programs. Significant differences between samples, stimuli, experimental designs, and our 
lack of viewing distance data make inferences highly speculative. However, on average, the 
distance between each manipulation condition was 5 pixels in our study. The previously  
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discussed research on JND thresholds indicate that visual acuity limitations may have 
affected our recognition data. To address JND concerns, future research could use stimuli 
with spatial manipulations within the boundaries of human visual acuity.   
 In addition to issues raised by visual acuity, field of vision limitations could have 
made it difficult for our participants to view both eyes using central, rather than peripheral, 
vision. This may have affected fine-grain inexactness, with fine-grain representations 
becoming more inexact in the outward manipulations. This conjecture is consistent with the 
observation that JND for outward manipulations exceed the JND for inward manipulations 
(Haig, 1984; Ge et al., 2003; Bredart & Devue, 2006). My failure to measure viewing 
distance prevented us from determining if the eyes on the outward manipulation faces fell 
within the 30 degrees of central vision (Spector, 1990). Despite this shortcoming, two 
findings in our study suggest that central field of vision limitations did not affect our results. 
First, both experiments failed to detect a significant difference in bias between inward and 
outward manipulations. Second, if central field of vision limitations increased fine-grain 
inexactness, manipulation condition eight should yielded the highest level of bias. Although 
the reduction in bias between manipulation conditions seven and eight was not statistically 
significant, testing for an increase in bias could not yield a significant result.     
 Although the literature testing the attention postulate of schema provides a sound 
theoretical argument for manipulating attention by varying schema consistency, future 
research could experiment with attentional manipulations. For example, researchers could 
use the distracter task employed by Huttenlocher (1991), which was found to moderate the 
category bias in memory for dots located within circles. Alternatively, researchers could  
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manipulate the amount of time participants have to view the stimulus. With either 
manipulation, varying the magnitude of the attention manipulation (e.g., the difficulty of the 
distracter task or the length of viewing time) would not be methodologically difficult and 
would provide a useful elaboration on the effect of attention in moderating category bias. 
Specifically, a within-subjects experiment varying attention along a continuum could 
determine the point at which decreasing attentional resources yields a significant effect, as 
well as the trend in bias (i.e., linear, logarithmic, or exponential, etc.). In sum, alternative 
attentional manipulations and continuum manipulations would contribute a useful elaboration 
on the effect of attention in moderating category bias in moderating facial memory.  
 To better ascertain the effect of time on moderating the category bias in facial 
memory, manipulating time within-participants would decrease the likelihood of an aberrant 
sample comprising a study. Additionally, varying time along a continuum would yield the 
same benefits as it would for attention. Specifically, a continuum manipulation would 
determine the delay necessary to produce an effect, as well as the function (e.g., does bias 
increase in a linear, exponential, or logarithmic manner) the bias follows as time passes.  
 The accuracy of facial memory has profound implications in our legal system. If the 
category adjustment model operates while a witness works with a sketch artist or uses a 
computer program to select and place features, the suspect’s face may differ considerably 
from the reproduction. When choosing a face out of a lineup, an eyewitness may select a 
person with a more prototypical face, as opposed to the suspect.   
 Although a subtle bias in placing the location of the eyes may seem like minutia in 
terms of affecting the overall accuracy of a reproduction, the category bias in facial memory  
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may apply to other spatial representations (e.g., the four-way relationship between the eyes, 
nose, and mouth). As the number of features affected by the category bias increases, the level 
of distortion in the reproduced face will increase. Consequently, future research elaborating 
on the category bias and feature relationships will serve a useful function in our criminal 
justice system.  
 Extending from the previously discussed practical implications, but moving away 
from spatial memory, future research could examine if a process conceptually related to the 
category bias occurs with featural processing. The Solso and McCarthy (1981) study 
provided evidence that people form a prototypical face by combining the model features of a 
face set. Additionally, Goldstein et al., (1977) postulated that, because of the same type of 
modal integration suggested by Solso and McCarthy, their participants committed false 
alarms with certain faces at a high frequency. Future research could first identify a 
prototypical facial feature in a population. Rich et al. (2008) used a morphing program to 
transform a facial expression of emotion from neutral to a strong emotion (e.g., rage). 
Researchers could then use the same morphing program to transform a prototypical feature 
into a schema atypical feature. Examining recognition accuracy at the prototype, in 
moderately distorted conditions, and in highly distorted conditions, as well as patterns in 
false alarms (i.e., do participants adjust responses towards the prototype until they reach the 
extreme condition) may identify a second process that affects the validity of eyewitness 
identification.   
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Figure 1. Bias plotted against manipulation condition for recall data in Experiment 1. On the 
x-axis, one denotes the condition where the eyes touch in the center of the face, and eight 
denotes the condition where the eyes are located at the outer edge of the face. A positive 
number on the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their recalled responses outwards; a 
negative number on the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their responses inwards. 
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Figure 2. Mean bias plotted against manipulation condition in Experiment 2. On the x-axis, 
one denotes the condition where the eyes touch in the center of the face, and eight denotes 
the condition where the eyes are located at the outer edge of the face. A positive number on 
the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their recalled responses outwards; a negative 
number on the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their responses inwards. 
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Table 1 
 
Recognition Accuracy Experiment 1 
 
     Response    
Input 
Manipulation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 62.6% 28.3% 4.4% 2.8% .9% .3% .6%  0% 
2 5.0% 57.8% 28.1% 4.7% 1.6% 1.9% .9%  0% 
3  0% 9.4% 58.8% 21.9% 6.3% 2.8% .3% .6% 
4 .6% 1.9% 22.0% 50.0% 20.4% 4.4% .6%  0% 
5  0% 1.3% 6.3% 25.7% 45.5% 18.5% 2.5% .3% 
6 .3% .3% 2.8% 7.5% 28.8% 48.9% 11.0% .3% 
7 .3%  0% 1.9% 2.8% 11.3% 40.8% 38.6% 4.4% 
8 .9% .6% .6% 2.2% 3.1% 13.5% 54.5% 24.5% 
 
Note. Table one displays responses by manipulation condition. Input manipulation is 
displayed on the vertical column. Responses are listed on the horizontal column. 
Percentages denote the percentage of participants who selected each face at recognition. 
When the input matches the response, participants chose the correct face. When the 
input does not match the response, participants committed a false alarm.   
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Table 2  
 
Recognition Accuracy Experiment 2 
 
Input 
Manipulation 
Response 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 69.1% 25.5% 1.8% 2.7% 0% .9% 0% 0% 
2 1.8% 60.0% 32.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 0% 0% 
3 0% 2.7% 63.6% 30.0% 3.6% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 0% 10.9% 60.9% 20.0% 7.3% .9% 0% 
5 0% 1.8% 2.7% 26.4% 53.6% 15.5% 0% 0% 
6 0% 0% 2.7% 3.6% 39.1% 47.3% 7.3% 0% 
7 0% 1.8% 0% 1.8% 10.0% 48.2% 36.4% 1.8% 
8 0% 0% .9% 1.8% .9% 15.5% 53.6% 27.3% 
 
Note. Table two displays responses by manipulation condition. Input manipulation is 
displayed on the vertical column. Responses are listed on the horizontal column. Percentages 
denote the percentage of participants who selected each face at recognition. When the input 
matches the response, participants chose the correct face. When the input does not match the 
response, participants committed a false alarm.   
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Appendix A  
TEST STIMULI FOR RECALL TASK AND PROTOTYPE IDENTIFICATION 
STAGE 
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Appendix B 
ACQUISTION STIMULI FOR RECALL TASK AND ACQUISITION AND TEST 
STIMULI FOR RECOGNITION TEST 
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